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I have a fading picture of my grandfather. His world was a
wilderness. Scarcity was a fact of life. Liberty was freedom from
scarcity. The Wealth of Nations was everyone's prosperity man-
ual. Mercifully, private institutions (with the help of government)
improved everyone's lot. We have to thank businesses like Gen-
eral Motors and United States Steel for that. In the 1990's, as
these institutions grow old, stodgy, and unwilling to change, one
wonders what will replace them? After EC-92, for example, what
will become of the Boeing Aircraft Company? Will it suffer the
fate that has befallen the nation's automobile, textile, and steel
industries? This article will sketch an answer.
II. OVERVIEW
In the beginning, America was defined by its towns and bucolic
settings. Communities were held together by nostalgia. Citizens
used the foibles of their neighbors to entertain themselves. The
world was both defined and refined by what people saw and
heard. The elderly used folksy sayings to teach children about
civilization's harsh realities.1 The world, they proclaimed, was a
dying place. Folks and machines slowed down and eventually
stopped operating. To cope with pain caused by loss (and it was
most certainly that), youngsters had to gather happiness and
entertainment in their lives.2
* Ronald C. Griffin is Professor of Law at Washburn University School of Law.
Professor Griffin is a graduate of Hampton Institute (B.S. 1965), Howard University
School of Law (J.D. 1968), and University of Virginia (LL.M. 1974).
1. Storytelling is one of the oldest ways known to mankind for imparting knowledge
to children about the world. See, e.g., R. BRADBURY, DANDELION WINE 48-52 (Bantam ed.
1990) A. HALEY, ROOTS: THE SAGA OF AN AMERICAN FAMILY 6-8 (1974).
2. See R. BRADBURY, supra note 1, at 48-52, 180-184.
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In an America held together with nostalgia, support of the
market mechanism and competition were positive values. Con-
tract law affirmed enterprises that produced things commanding
economic value.8 Damages put people in positions they would
have enjoyed if promises had been kept.4 Community disappro-
bation, as well as the criminal courts, kept the mavericks in
check. Crime wasn't the ubiquitous thing it is today.
This version of the sentient world, at best isolationist, left
Americans ill-equipped to deal with world problems. It didn't
provide the people with a vocabulary to cope with unruly foreign
governments, rapacious corporations, notions about citizenship,
job dislocations and "foreigner."
America needed a new vision. Freud and Drucker 6 provided
inventors and tinkerers with the raw materials. The world, they
wrote, had gone through a westernizing process.7 Decoloniza-
tion-local control of events-had taken root in Africa and Asia.
The agents of change, by and large Europeans, had retreated to
their continent. Europeans nevertheless maintained a strong pres-
ence in North America, South America and the southern tip of
Africa.
In this century, Europe's civil wars (World Wars I and II)
failed to produce a clear winner. Outsiders like the United States
and the Soviet Union were the apparent victors s The vacuum,
hegemony to be won from decimated European powers, was filled
by the aforementioned nations. With the passage of time, the
United States and the Soviet Union got sucked into the great
Commercial Basin.
The Basin's frontier began in the United States with the state
of Washington, and extended east to the farthest European
outpost in Russia.9 Like a Texas oil rig, observers can see the
market mechanism pumping riches from the landscape. Lawyers
have converted statutory language into intelligible expressions.
Commercial discourse has been reduced to conversational English,
3. J. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 8-9 (1959).
4. Vernon, Expectancy Damages for Breach of Con'tracts; A Primer and a Critique, 1976
WASH. U.L.Q. 179-180.
5. Freud, Thoughts for the Times on War and Death, in GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN
WORLD, Vol. 54, at 755-66 (1982).
6. P. DRUCKER, THE NEW REALITIES 3-58, 115-72 (1989).
7. Id. at 27-30.
8. See P. KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS 93-94, 286-90, 366-72
(1987).
9. P. DRUCKER, supra note 6, at 35-36.
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French, Spanish, Russian, and German. America and Canada,
England and France have been granted domains. Countries have
formed economic unions, like the EEC, to free their people to
compete with decolonized rivals like the City State of Singapore,
Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Japan.10
Basinites use commercial laws as conversation pieces to gather
understanding and cooperation, from other basinites, in arenas
strewn with cultural barricades and ancestral traditions." Utter-
ances and representations prompting detrimental reliance create
obligations. 12 Utterers, actors and reacting parties are subject to
a duty to act in good faith. 8 Breach of the duty invested the
injured party with the power to both modify an obligation and
exact specific performance. 4 When an obligation collapses, inter-
national conventions, the publication of the utterer's bad repu-
tation, the law of obligations, reliance and balance theories have
been invoked to secure an injured party's expectations.
That brings us to the task at hand. Having abandoned nostalgia
for the basin concept the question is: what economic calamities
will American businesses have to weather following EEC inte-
gration? A partial answer will be assembled from the activities
of the Boeing Aircraft Company-the nation's largest employer
and leading exporter. 5 Section III will be an overview of the
aircraft industry and Boeing's role in it. Section IV will survey
legal matters like the Convention on the International Sale of,
10. Id. at 131-32.
11. See, e.g., G. Roy, THE TIN FLUTE, 297-99 (McClellan & Stewart ed., 1989). Ms. Roy
(a brilliant Canadian author) recounts Quebec opposition to Anglo Canadian legal regimes
which threatened French culture in Canada. There are other obstacles like rugged
individualism, the American obsession with remaking other countries in its own image,
and finally, the Western tendency to interpret the actions of other nations as if they
were like us. F.L.K. Hsu, RUGGED INDIVIDUALISM, 10-11, 407-18 (1983).
12. P. ATIYAH, PRAGMATISM AND THEORY IN ENGLISH LAW 173-74 (1987). Reputable
American scholars have tinkered with Atiyah's notions. Goetz & Scott, Principles of
Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1091, 1123, 1126, 1138-40 (1981); see Linzer,
Uncontracts: Context and the Relational Approach, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 139.
13. Goetz & Scott, supra note 12, at 1138-40.
14. See, e.g., Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods, Apr. 10, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 97/18, with Annex, United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, arts. 45(1Xa), 46, reprinted
in J. HONNOLD. UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION 764 (1982) [hereinafter Convention].
15. J. NEWHOUSE, THE SPORTY GAME: THE HIGH RISK COMPETITIVE BUSINESS OF MAKING
AND SELLING COMMERCIAL AIRLINERS 37, 73 (1982); EEC '92: What it Means to Boeing
Salas, PUGET SOUND BUS. J., May 1, 1990, Vol. 9, Sec. 1, p. 23.
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Goods (CISG), contract terms, negotiating strategies and govern-
ment subsidies affecting the Boeing business. Section V will
sketch new arenas, like avionic innovations,e where Boeing and
Airbus will compete. Section VI will weigh and evaluate the
observations made in the previous sections and draw some con-
clusions.
III. THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY AND BOEING'S
CURRENT ROLE
The airplane business is both cyclical and quirky. The customer
market is small. The demand for change is unending. Energy
shortages, fanned by crises in the Middle East, fuel demands for
efficient engines.17 Concern about noise pollution creates a de-
mand for quieter propulsion systems. Politics, like the govern-
ment's use of trade legislation to block Boeing's exportations of
spare parts to Libya, eschews demand.'8 Problem laden innovation
makes aircraft manufacturing risky. 9 Finally, the specter of Ja-
pan as a rival galvanizes competition between Europe's manufac-
turer and its American rivals.2u
Boeing, Airbus Industries, and McDonnell-Douglas produce most
of the world's aircraft. Boeing controls 50% of the market.21
Airbus claims 30% of the market.22 McDonnell-Douglas and smaller
firms preside over the rest.25 Each company designs and sells
airframes. The engines come from Pratt-Whitney, General Elec-
tric, Snecma, and Rolls-Royce."
Boeing views airplanes as a source of revenue to spend on new
airframes.25 It coddles its customers with a squad of engineers
saddled with the mission "solve customer problems."26 Its sales-
16. E.g., Flannigan, G.E., Pratt Signal Hope Beyond Budget Crisis, L.A. Times, Oct. 14,
1990, at D1, col. 2; Stevenson, Boeing and McDonnell Joining the Concorde Study, N.Y.
Times, May 24, 1990, at C2, col. 4; cf. J. NEWHOUSE, supra note 15, at 5.
17. J. NEWHOUSE, supra note 15, at 12.
18. Id. at 38-9, 42.
19. Id. at 3, 11.
20. Id. at 45.
21. Id. at 32, 37.
22. Id. at 32.
23. Id. at 5, 6, 26, 39.
24. Id. at 127. A consortium of foreign aircraft companies are a threat to today's engine
manufacturers. Id. at 46.
25. Id. at 36.
26. Id. at 171.
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persons blanket the globe. The company's large and varied in-
ventory allows Boeing to meet the needs of most airplane
purchasers. Its plants are located in the United States.2 It has
subcontracted work with firms in England, Canada, and China in
the past. It has flirted with joint ventures in Japan.28
Airbus Industries is a consortium.29 It is funded by the gov-
ernments of England, France, Germany, and Spain. Airbus sees
airplanes as a source of employment.3° Contributing governments
see Airbus as an instrument of national policy, that is, an em-
ployer of last resort that has slowed the "brain drain" from
Europe to the United States.31 Airbus has helped contributing
countries establish favorable trade and payment balances.
2 It
sees itself as a builder of variant aircraft as opposed to a family
of aircraft like Boeing. It services the needs of European, Far
Eastern and Near Eastern airliners.3 The firm's goals are stable
production, delivery schedules, and market in America. 4
McDonnell-Douglas is the least competitive firm. It is the
product of a merger of the McDonnell and the Douglas Aircraft
Corporations. In the 1950's, Douglas was the leading commercial
aircraft manufacturer in the world. After Boeing took the lead
in the jet aircraft business, Douglas spent huge sums, both
borrowed money and its own, to become Boeing's peer.35 Debt
and a slow return on investment ruined the company. To avoid
complete ruin, the Douglas family accepted McDonnell's offer to
buy the firm.3 The purchaser installed its own management team
imbued with the idea that Boeing's or Airbus's bad luck, or some
ill-considered decision, would turn the acquired firm around.37
27. Id. at 50.
28. Id. at 45-46, 138.
29. Id. at 33, 36, 193-95; AIRBUS TODAY 6 (1990) (Airbus Industries is a grouping of
Europe's civil aircraft manufacturers: Aerospatiale of France, Duetche Airbus of West
Germany, British Aerospace and Casa of Spain).
30. J. NEWHOUSE, supra note 15, at 34.
31. Id. at 33.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 37-39 (North America is its largest market); see AIRBUS TODAY, supra note
29, at 8; cf. J. NEWHOUSE, supra note 15, at 195.
34. J. NEWHOUSE, supra note 15, at 35, 55-56; see AIRBUS TODAY, supra note 29, at 8.
35. J. NEWHOUSE, supra note 15, at 134.
36. Id. at 135.
37. See id. at 136-37.
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A. The Interrelated Aircraft Industry
In the airplane business the start-up cost is one billion dollars.
Under most projects, manufacturers have to wait fourteen years
for profits.3 The learning curve-workers repeating production
tasks without mistakes-can reduce labor costs by twenty per-
cent.3 Manufacturers have to cut their prices faster than com-
petitors. They are obliged to coddle and cajole airline employees
(engineers and management teams) to glean purchaser needs.
They have to design planes with traffic growth patterns on long,
middle and short range routes in mind. They have to be wary of
the competitive maneuvers of engine suppliers.40 They can wreak
havoc upon the best laid airframe plans. They have to be mindful
of the jockeying among airline companies. 41 Their actions can
affect a manufacturer's sales, profits and competitiveness.
Consider the following: Airline carriers will use their flight
schedules to net their rivals' customers. Each will claim that it
can transport customers from point to point in the shortest span
of time, with or without stops, at attractive prices. If McDonnell-
Douglas offers American Airlines an airplane that gives it a
speed advantage over rival carriers, like Delta or United Airlines,
these rivals will buy a similar aircraft from a competing manu-
facturer to force McDonnell-Douglas, which needs two airline
orders, to withdraw from the field. 42
The behavior of engine suppliers can topple the best laid plans.
The Lockheed fiasco is an example.43 In the 1960's, a banking
syndicate provided Lockheed with four hundred million dollars
to finance the L-1011 project. The planes were to carry a specified
amount of weight. Lockheed made a contract with Rolls-Royce
to supply 544 engines bearing weights within the project's weight
specification. There was a breakdown in the performance of this
agreement. Rolls-Royce, the supplier, had to replace a composite
38. Id. at 21.
39. Id. at 19..
40. See, e.g., Weiner, Suppliers in Loan to Northwest: $500 Million Given by Airbus and
G.E., N.Y. Times, Sep. 21, 1990, at C1, col. 2; Betts, Japanese to Share in G.E. Jet Engine
Program, Fin. Times, Oct. 4, 1990, S 1, at 5.
41. J. NEWHOUSE, supra note 15, at 3, 149; see Weiner, Suppliers in Loan to Northwest,
supra, note 40.
42. Weiner, Suppliers in Loan to Northwest, supra note 40; Weiner, Unusual Deal by
America West Seen, N.Y. Times, Sep. 25, 1990 at C5, col. 4.
43. J. NEWHOUSE, supra note 15, at 173-83.
EUROPEAN DREAM
carbon fibre and resin fan blade with a titanium blade which
raised the engine weight. The change dropped the engine's fuel
efficiency, increased the airframe's weight, and broke the guar-
antee Rolls-Royce made to Lockheed.
Technical problems, a poor estimate of the actual cost of the
engines and other costs, forced Rolls-Royce into bankruptcy."
The British government purchased the supplier's military con-
tracts. It made an agreement with Lockheed regarding the late
delivery of the L-1011 engines. The Crown promised to perform
the Rolls-Royce contract provided Lockheed shouldered half of
the additional cost ($288 million).45
With this unfolding of events, Lockheed wandered into the
vortex of increasing costs and irate customers who fretted about
the timely delivery of their planes. The company could see lost
sales, lost profits, shrinking market share or bankruptcy on the
horizon. Lockheed had two choices. It could file a contract claim
against Rolls-Royce in bankruptcy. It could modify its contracts
with purchasers and creditors, hoping both would go along with
the deals.
In time, Lockheed got its modifications." The British govern-
ment performed Rolls-Royce's contract. For consideration, liens
in all of Lockheed's manufacturing assets and other compensation,
the United States government provided the British Crown with
a guarantee that Lockheed would make its payments. 47 After
Lockheed completed its performance, installed its engines, paid
its creditors, and brought the L-1011 project to a merciful end,
the manufacturer got out of the commercial airline business. It
left the market to firms like Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas.
B. Boeing Versus The Airbus Miracle
There is marketing. Airbus Industries' success is a modern day
miracle. World War II decimated Europe's capacity to manufac-
ture commercial aircraft. The world's airliners purchased Amer-
ican products. Around the world, American firms bore a reputation
for efficiency. They, the airliners were told, produced safe aircraft
44. Id. at 175, 177.
45. Id. at 179, 181.
46. Id. at 182 (Lockheed's customers agreed to pay an additional $640,000 for each of
their L-1011 planes).
47. Id. (The government was granted a lien in Lockheed's assets).
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in the sizes and volume needed. Nobody thought that the British
or the French could compete with the Americans in development,
manufacturing and marketing.
Airbus Industries was Europe's response. It is a multinational
entity.4 It is the titular manager of government owned and
subsidized corporations. 49 In a complex business network, each
company, like tentacles from a common body, performs acts to
fulfill commitments made by Airbus.5 Airbus makes design, pro-
duction and marketing decisions. 51 Contributing governments make
investment decisions affecting new Airbus aircraft.5 2 Airbus serv-
ices Air France, Lufthanza, Scandinavian and a few non-European
carriers like Air India.
In 1976, Boeing made a number of discoveries. First, 70 percent
of its airline business came from foreign countries.5' Second,
Airbus was its principal competitor. Third, because Airbus was
subsidized by several governments, in a worldwide price war
Boeing could lose a handsome number of customers. Fourth,
Boeing could not rely upon military contracts, or higher priced
domestic airline contracts, to subsidize lower priced aircraft sold
abroad. In summary, Boeing had to do something about Airbus.
Since American manufacturers could not act collusively by
contracting with one another to make aircraft in competition with
Airbus, Boeing had to go abroad to find partners.54 It adopted
48. Id. at 33, 49; see Letter from P. Cottle to Ronald Griffin & Teresa Machicao (Oct.
10, 1990) (letter to author from Airbus Industries' legal counsel, including booklet AIRBUS
TODAY); AIRBUS TODAY, supra note 29 at 6, 7.
49. J. NEWHOUSE, supra note 15, at 33, 45.
50. Id. at 33, 193-94; cf. European Ministers will Discuss Restructuring Airbus Consor-
tium, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECH. 114 (Feb. 15, 1988).
51. J. NEWHOUSE, supra note 15, at 194.
52. Id. at 33.
53. Id. at 37, 138.
54. Under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1 (1982), Congress has forbidden
businesses to engage in collusive activity. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTI-
TRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 71, 81-84 (1988). If arrangements suppress or
destroy competition, they are condemnable under the Sherman Act. Id. at 82. The question
is one of intent and effect. Id.; see Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231
(1918); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). The aforementioned
cases advance a rule of broad discretion in favor of courts weighing competitive market
factors before reaching an antitrust conclusion. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra, it 83
(efficiency and integration of productive capacity are acceptable antitrust inquiries and
defenses).
Section 1, The Sherman Act, covers business activity inaugurated by joint ventures.
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two strategies. First, Boeing flirted with Rolls-Royce and, later
purchased its engines from this manufacturer, to weaken British
ties to Airbus.s Second, Boeing incorporated both British aero-
space wing technology and Rolls-Royce engines into aircraft it
marketed in Europe.s
There was a change in demand in the 1980's. Airliners urged
manufacturers to make planes to replace the Boeing 727. At that
time, Boeing could not build new planes without a foreign partner.
McDonnell-Douglas could not keep pace with demand. Lockheed
had withdrawn from the field creating a vacuum that was filled
by Airbus.
Airbus took advantage of the situation. Using appealing loan
agreements and credit contracts, Airbus targeted prestigious
American airliners, enfeebled by government deregulation, then
wooed them to its pen. It derided Boeing's campaign to recapture
lost customers. Since Airbus used General Electric technology in
its engines, Airbus marketed its airplanes in the United States
by claiming that its planes were imbued with American reliabil-
ity.51
Airbus pressed its campaign in the 1990's. The agreements
concluded with Northwest Airlines and America West Airlines
corroborating the recent turn of events.M As of this writing,
Northwest was swimming in debt.59 To help the firm relieve itself
of debt, Airbus, with the aid of General Electric, provided the
airliner with millions of dollars in exchange for a promise to buy
a billion dollars worth of Airbus airplanes.6 In recent weeks,
America West proclaimed an interest in buying one of Pan
United States v. Addyston Pipe, 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd 175 U.S. 1 (1904). Sullivan
and Harrison call them entities assembled by two independent firms for research,
production, and marketing activity. SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra, at 100. By gaining
skills, spreading risks, achieving certain economies of scale, the joint firms achieve
efficiencies and an appetite for research and production which single firms are unwilling
to undertake on their own. Id. Lamentably, there is a down side to joint venture activity.
There is a potential for price fixing, out-put restrictions, market division, increased
monopoly power, and other anticompetition activity. These are temptations faced by the
airframe business. They are illegal under the Sherman Act.
55. Id. at 201.
56. Id. at 201-02; see O'Lone, Airframe Manufacturers Seek Sales Opportunities in
Eastern Bloc, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH. 112-13 (Feb. 15, 1988).
57. J. NEWHOUSE, supra note 15, at 192.
58. Weiner, Suppliers in Loan to Northwest, supra note 40, at C1, col. 2; Weiner,
Unusual Deal by America West Seen, supra note 42, at C5, col. 4.
59. Weiner, Suppliers in Loan to Northwest, supra note 40, at C1, col. 2.
60. I&
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American's shuttle services. The price tag was 200 million dollars.
If America West promised to either lease or purchase 100 Airbus
planes, Guiness Peat Aviation, the world's largest aircraft-leasing
company, and International Aero Engines, a consortium of engine
manufacturers that includes Pratt-Whitney and Kawasaki, prom-
ised to lend America West the cash. 61
Boeing has responded to this campaign by both attacking the
Airbus funding scheme 62 and marketing in Eastern Europe."
Thanks to a subsidy of 13.5 billion dollars (revalued at 29.5 billion)
Airbus has become Boeing's principal competitor." Boeing has
asserted that the subsidy violates GATT." If Boeing puts an end
to the subsidy or gets it reduced, like Boeing, Airbus will have
to both beg for money to fund new projects and worry about
profits. With the assistance of the United States government,
Boeing hopes that it can make Airbus play by its rules. If Airbus
has to spend more time marketing for money, Boeing can recap-
ture some of its lost customers.
In Eastern Europe, with the heightened demand for western
aircraft, and the sluqiping demand for Soviet built planes, Boeing
61. Weiner, Unusual Deal by America West Seen, supra note 42, at C5.
62. See Field, European Jet Giant Fights Charge It Unfairly Subsidized, Wash. Times,
Oct. 8, 1990, at D5.
63. O'Lone, supra note 56, at 112-13.
64. Field, supra note 62, at D5.
65. EEC '92: What It Means to Boeing Sales, supra note 15, at 23.
In 1944, representatives from 44 countries assembled at Bretton Woods, New Hamp-
shire, to chart the world's post war economy. GALBRAITH, THE AGE OF UNCERTAINTY, 224
(1977); GALBRAITH, MONEY: WHENCE IT CAME, WHERE IT WENT 310-15 (Bantam ed. 1976).
Different organizations emerged from the Bretton Woods conference: The International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the
World Bank. FOLSON, GORDON & SPANOGLE. INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: A
PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 17 (1986) [hereinafter SPANOGLE].
The GATT is now a major source of international trade law. It is an organization
within which the United States, Japan, and the European Economic Community discuss
their most important trading concerns. Id. Unlike the United Nations, the GATT does
not have a court to which parties may take their disputes. Its regulatory role is
accomplished through expected adherence by members to the rules in the General
Agreement and other developed codes, often called "side agreements." Id. at 18. When
a nation violates the GATT, the members hope that working panels, assembled under
the GATT, and the GATT rulings will bring an end to the bad behavior. Id.
The scope of the GATT is extensive. In addition to most favor nation treatment, it
covers customs classification, government procurement, customs valuation, subsidies and
countervailing duties, dumping practices and antidumping duties, import injury and escape
clause proceedings, export subsidies, and import quotas. It covers arrangements like
customs unions, free trade associations, and generalized systems of preferences to help
developing nations. Id.
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has proposed a sale or a lease of its 767 aircraft to Poland's state
owned airliner (LOT).6 The company has made offers to Romania
and Czechoslovakia. 7 It has picked up Hungary's proposal to
lease aircraft from a western firm like .Guiness Peat Aviation,
provided the leasing firm has purchased aircraft from Boeing."
What Boeing sees in this strategy (or one hopes it saw) is a
way to penetrate "Fortress Europe" in hopes of claiming and
maintaining markets there. Across the Atlantic, in the Common
Market, twelve nations have coordinated their political and eco-
nomic policies in ways which threaten Boeing. In Eastern Europe,
six liberated nations seek affiliation with the twelve. All have
embraced policies that both (a) subsidize key industries and (b)
limit off-shore manufacturing influences, to raise the European's
standard of living." This blend is to take place in 1992 and is
commonly referred to as EC-92.
When Europe accomplishes some of the aforementioned goals,
such as raising everyone's living standard, introducing a standard
European currency, retiring old airplanes, and allocating air routes
to sixteen nations, so that each nation's airliners can reach
customers in neighboring states, there will be an explosion in
demand for short range and long range aircraft that Boeing will
service with a weaker Airbus competitor.
IV. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATTERS
Assuming EC-92 is at hand, it will create a large trading arena
within the Great Basin. Governments will put refitted market
mechanisms in different places. Entrepreneurs will queue on
supply curves in accordance with the rules of competitive and
comparative advantage. Demand curves will swing left and right.
Movement will be dictated by the public consumption of goods,
decisions to replenish depleted inventories, and patented inven-
tions and subsidies. Personalty, realty and information will be
labeled "property." Capital will be the aforementioned objects
being managed by individuals and firms. People and firms will
66. O'Lone, supra note 56, at 112-13; cf. Flint, Eastern Europe will Absorb Western
Aircraft 27 Air Transport World 48 (No.3 March 1990).
67. O'Lone, supra note 56, at 112-13.
68. Id-
69. The European Cake: Who Eats at the Table, 7 INT'L & FIN. L. REv. 13 (1988).
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become capitalists when they are freed of the obligation to spend
themselves on the production of "new" capital. At that moment
something wonderful will happen to the capitalist. He, she, or it
will receive the power to influence others by imposing any
condition upon someone's proposal to use, buy or rent their
property. Contracts will become the concessions the capitalist
extracts from the offerors.
Across the Basin, contract liability will be based upon a statute,
bargain, benefit or reliance theories. A contract, for example,
will be the sum of offer and acceptance.70 Courts will find an
agreement when the minds of the parties have met. Where a
promise fetches consideration or reliance, there will be a con-
tract.7 1 Where a promise fetches nothing, judges will be fitted
with the discretion to determine whether a writing is valid.72 If
the writing saddles the people with "rights" and "duties," the
court will find implied promises.7 8 If a writing proclaims an
exchange of "comparable values," the court will treat it like a
contract.7 When a person confers a benefit upon someone else,
who knowingly and willingly accepts it, the recipient will be
saddled with the duty to pay for it.5 Where businesses are
building a long term relationship -and, in the negotiation, the
seller has access to information which his customer cannot ac-
cess-the seller will be under a duty to disclose all he knows. If
he omits something from his report, that will be a misrepresen-
tation. If the customer relies upon the report to his detriment,
the seller will have to shoulder the damages.
Any speech, symbolic speech or writing, provoking reliance
will create an obligation. The parties will be saddled with the
duty to act in good faith and to follow statutes to the letter.
Breach of this duty will invest the injured party with the option
70. P. ATIYAH, PRAGMATISM AND THEORY IN ENGLISH LAW 170 (1987) [hereinafter P.
ATIYAH, PRAGMATISM]; See, e.g., Lucy v. Zehmer, 196 Va. 493, 84 S.E.2d 516 (1954); cf. G.
GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACTS 87 (1974); Levin and McDowell, The Balance Theory of
Contracts: Seeking Justice in Voluntary Obligations, 29 McGILL L.J. 25, 3440 (1983); P.
ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 716-17, 729, 771 (1979) [hereinafter
P. ATIYAH, RISE AND FALL].
71. See, e.g., Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N.Y. 538, 27 N.E. 256 (1891); Levin & McDowell,
supra note 70; see also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS S 211 (1981); P. ATIYAH,
RISE AND FALL, supra note 69, at 731, 734, 764-79.
72. Levin & McDowell, supra note 69, at 25-26, 39.
73. P. ATIYAH, RISE AND FALL, supra note 69, at 735.
74. Id. at 734.
75. See C. FRIED, CONTRACTS AS PROMISE 17, 125 (1981).
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to (a) modify the obligation, (b) sue for damages, or (c) petition
for specific performance.76
Damages will limit the use of traditional contract theory. Plain-
tiffs will have to sustain injuries cognizable in contract law. In a
construction contract case, for example, "substantial performance"
will count as a reason for recovering damages.77 When a contractor
has tendered "completed performance" that is "defect free," that
will count as a reason for recovering damages. 78 If a contract's
liquidated damages clause generates a sum that is twice, or less
than twice, the profit the contractor sought from the bargain, the
plaintiff (contractor) will have to content himself with actual dam-
ages.79 If the plaintiff is a merchant, and the defendant is familiar
with his business, the court will surmise that the defendant knew
about the business risks (lost profits) to be borne by the plaintiff.
If a writing bonding plaintiff to defendant creates an expectation
that, in turn, provokes reliance, defendant must shoulder liability
for direct and derivative reliance damage.81
In America, we will see a contractual hierarchy. It will look like
Figure A. At the base of the pyramid you will find the common
law (K=O + A). On the next level, one above the bottom, you will
find statutes (UCC). On the next level, you will find conventions
like the Paris Patent Convention (PPC) and the Convention on the





If the contract is for construction or services, disputes will be
resolved with the common law. If the agreement covers goods,
76. Convention, supra note 14, arts. 45(1Xa-b), 46.
77. See, e.g., Jacob & Young v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921); Shaeffer v.
Keiton, 95 N.M. 182, 619 P.2d 1226 (1980).
78. See E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 562 (1990); Waddams, Restitution for Part-Perform-
antce, in SWAN & REITER, STUDIES IN CONTRACTS 151, 152 nn.1-2 (1980).
79. See, e.g., Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985).
80. See Swinton, Foreseeability: Where Should the Award of Contract Damages Cease?,
in SWAN & REITER, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 69-80 (1980).
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disputes will be resolved with Article Two of the Code (UCC). If
a buyer or a seller is trying to affix a lien to goods, disputes
about attachment, perfection, and remedies will be resolved under
Articles Two and Nine of the Code. If someone has pirated
someone else's technology in a sister country, the dispute will
be resolved under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) PPC. If the parties come from different nations, disputes
will be resolved under the CISG.81 If the parties are groping
towards contract formation or pondering about a breach, the
parties will use the law of obligations to soothe frayed nerves.8 2
Across the Atlantic, we will find an established hierarchy.
Patrick Atiyah has described it best. In England, the law comes
from Parliament.8 That law is glossed by the courts. The law
itself is composed of history and experiences, precedent and the
work of academics.m Contract law is a good example.
Contract law, he has said, is the work of pragmatic lawyers
and academic economists." It is erected to protect a person's
bargained-for expectation.m We are told that contract law is both
general and neutral. 7 It is unconcerned about the various types
of contracts and the different sorts of people who enter into
them.8M If a court is presented with a signed writing, it will treat
the document like a contract.R If the writing saddles the signa-
tories with rights and duties," the court will find implied prom-
ises. If the writing is executory, the parties are provided with
an opportunity to escape their duties. 1 If the writing proclaims
the exchange of comparable values, the court will say the agree-
ment is valid. If there is a breach, the court will award the
injured party damages.
Assume for a moment that A wants to make a contract with
B. A is an airplane manufacturer. B manufactures parts for
81. Convention, supra note 14, arts. 1, 6.
82. See Linzer, Uncontracts: Context, Contorts and the Relational Approach, 1988 ANNUAL
SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 139, 152-66; P. ATIYAH, PRAGMATISM, supra note 70, at 173-74.
83. P. ATIYAH, PRAGMATISM, supra note 70, at 150.
84. Id. at 93-96, 165-74.
85. Id. at 165-6.
86. Id. at 168.
87. Id. at 170.
88. Id.
89. P. ATIYAH, RISE AND FALL, supra note 70, at 733; see P. ATIYAH, PRAGMATISM, supra
note 70, at 173-74.
90. P. ATIYAH, RISE AND FALL, supra note 70, at 735.
91. Id. at 734.
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commercial airplanes. A provides B with an airplane plan and
specifications for a nacelle (an aerodynamic structure that sur-
rounds a jet engine) that is accompanied by a request that "B
supply A with a price." B returns A's specifications with a price.
A sends a modified specification to B with the inquiry, "Can I
get these changes at your quoted price?" B says, "yes." On
September 30th, A faxes B a letter, "Upon your agreement to
ship a finished nacelle in six weeks you may begin work." On
October 1st, B hired 12 employees and purchased several tons of
raw material. On October 8th, A told B to "stop work." A had
found a cheaper supplier in England. What are the issues? What
is A's position on the issues? What is B's position on the issues?
The problem presents many issues. There are: price quotation,
contract formation, breach, compensation and damages. In con-
tract, courts refuse to treat price quotations as offers.92 If the
quotation is accompanied by a positive statement which leaves
nothing open for interpretation, a quote will be treated like an
offer. In this case, the quote isn't escorted by anything. Given
this observation about the facts, it follows that the quote won't
be treated as an offer to make a contract.
In practice, however, a person can use both objective and
subjective theories to make a contract." The objective theory is
composed of offer and acceptance (K=O+A). Since there was no
offer in this case, of necessity, there could be no acceptance.
You could try to make a contract out of the correspondence
between A and B. If the September 30th letter is treated like
an offer, the question is: Did B communicate an acceptance?
Generally speaking, offers are composed of promises, solicitations
and some instructions about the communication of acceptance.9 4
If the instruction is missing, the offeree (B) may either tender a
performance or communicate a promise as acceptance.95 The Re-
statement proclaims that the performance must be unique-
92. See Owen v. Tunison, 131 Me. 42, 158 A. 926 (1932). For a less strained interpretation
of language of negotiation, see Southworth v. Oliver, 284 Or. 361, 587 P.2d 994 (1978).
93. There is a notion that the subjective theory should be confined to face-to-face
negotiations. Kabil v. Mignot. 279 Or. 151, 566 P.2d 505 (1977); see G. GILMORE, 8upra
note 70, at 41-43.
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS SS 24, 32, 54, 58, 71 (1981); FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS 135-36, 150 (1990) (consideration isolates what the parties sought from one
another); see also G. Gilmore, supra note 70, at 19-21.
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS SS 32, 54(1)-(2) (1981).
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unlike B's performance - to the proposal to make a contract.96
Since B's performance was generic, we cannot treat it like an
acceptance. Since there was an offer, but no acceptance, there
was no contract between A and B.
You could assemble a contract with subjective theory (K = M x
M).97 It appears that the minds of the parties met. In this case,
however, subjective theory analyses must give way to statutory
analyses. Since the subject matter is goods, and the disputants
are respectively buyer and seller, the analysis must be done
under the Uniform Commercial Code."
There is a contract between the parties under section 2-204.
The buyer's expectation is a nacelle. The seller's expectation is
payment." The seller expected the buyer to act in good faith,
that is, to do nothing that blocked or delayed the seller's receipt
of payment.1"0 In this case, the buyer breached his good faith
duty. He (A) both broke his contract with B and made a ccntract
with someone else. Given these observations about the facts, it
would appear that B is entitled to damages.
Since the disputants are not from different countries, there is
no reason to apply the CISG. Under the law of obligations,
borrowing a bit from the English and the Canadians, B could use
good faith as a roost to get damages for the employees he hired
and the raw material he purchased. 101 If A and B have an on-
going relationship, and A is familiar with B's business, a court
might surmise that "A knew about the business risks shouldered
by B." If A created expectations upon which B detrimentally
relied, A may have to shoulder the damages. In summary, A
should hide under the objective theory. B should attack A with
either the subjective theory or the U.C.C. Finally, A may be
liable to B for consequential damages.
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS S 50(2) (1981); see White v. Corlies, 46 N.Y. 467
(1871).
97. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. 463 (1976); Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep.
375 (1864); cf. G. GILMORE, supra note 70, at 28-33, 39-42.
98. U.C.C. SS 2-102, 2-104(1). 2-105(1), 2-106(1) (1989).
99. U.C.C. S 2-301 (1989).
100. U.C.C. S 1-203, 2-103(1b) (1989); see Bak-A-Lum of America v. ALCOA Bldg.
Prods. Inc., 69 NJ. 123, 351 A.2d 349 (1976); FRIED, CONTRACTS AS PROMISE 74 (1981); see
also Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code: A Theory of Good Faith Performance and
Enforcement Under Article Nine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 382-88 (1988).
101. See Swinton, supra note 80, at 69-80; see also P. ATIYAH, RISE AND FALL, supra
note 70, at 460-61.
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A. An International Example
Unfortunately, the previous hypothetical doesn't raise inter-
national issues. The next, and the last, hypothetical addresses
that shortcoming. It is an attempt to put contract theory and
modern airplane transactions in focus.
A is an American manufacturer of airplanes.102 B is a German
purchaser. C is an American engine manufacturer. He makes
Widget engines for A and B. In July, 1989, A made a contract
with B. The airplane manufacturer promised to sell and B prom-
ised to buy "Seventy Bubble-1011" with Widget engines. In
October, 1989, B initiated a conversation with C. B told C: "Send
me the price list for two thousand units of 'knickknacks'... the
spare part which goes into Widget engines." C sent B a price
list which featured the "knickknacks." They were priced at $200
per 100 units, F.O.B. Plant, Kansas City. Two days later, B sent
C a Telex. "We order today Two Thousand (2000) units of Knick-
knacks for $400,000 F.O.B. Kansas City for immediate delivery
to Darmstadt, Federal Republic of Germany." On the same day,
C responded by sending its Order Acknowledgement Form to B.
In the form, C wrote: "We accept your order to buy Two Thou-
sand units of Knickknacks for $400,000 F.O.B. Kansas City. Goods
sold as is and with all faults. This contract is governed by the
laws of -(blank)." The form was signed by C.
The Knickknacks were delivered to a Swedish vessel. It shipped
the goods to Germany and presented them to B for acceptance.
B accepted the goods and paid C. In April, 1990, B performed a
minor repair on a Bubble plane. When he tried to install a
Knickknack in a Widget engine, B discovered that the spare part*
did not fit that particular Widget engine or any Widget engine
attached to a Bubble plane. B was outraged. A had told B that
C was a reputable engine and spare parts manufacturer. After
the lament, B secured spare parts with the right dimensions from
a rival supplier. B is upset. He comes to you for advice. What
do you tell him?
In this case, I would start with a long pause. My response
would be preceded by a careful analysis of the issues. They are:
battle of the forms (UCC),103 choice of law,1° German law,105 EC-
102. This problem was assembled with parts from a problem in SPANOGLE, 8upra note
65, at 57-58.
103. U.C.C. S 2-207 (1989).
104. U.C.C. S 1-105 (1989); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS S 188 (1971);
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Convention on Contract Obligations, 1°6 Convention on the Inter-
national Sale of Goods, 10 warranty,1 8 insurance,109 and damages.110
As regards the U.C.C., I would use section 2-207 to analyze the
correspondence between B and C. Generally speaking, a contract
comes into existence when the correspondence of the parties
match. Since B and C sent matching correspondence, within
several days of one another, there's a contract between the
parties.
The next issue is choice of law. Under U.C.C. section 1-105,
the law for this contract is either (1) the one chosen by the
parties or (2) the one illuminated by the "significant contact
test."' Since the parties didn't choose a law, we must select one
for them. In that regard, the language of section 1-105 accepts,
or is broad enough to accommodate, Restatement ideas. Given
this observation about the facts, we are free to use section 188
of the Restatement on Conflicts.
104. U.C.C. S 1-105 (1989); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS S 188 (1971);
Seaman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403 (1927) (outlining the reasonable
relations list). Where a transaction bears a reasonable relation to a particular state or
nation, section 1-105(1) permits the parties by agreement to make the law of that state
or nation applicable to their transaction. Section 1-105(1) further provides that failing
such an agreement, "this Act applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to
this state." U.C.C. S 1-105(1) (1989).
The Code does not specify what constitutes an appropriate relation. Further, it does
not indicate whether, and if so, to what extent the appropriate relations provision is
intended to depart from traditional conflicts rules. It could be argued that a transaction
does not bear an "appropriate relation" to a jurisdiction unless the law of that jurisdiction
would be the proper one to apply under normal conflicts-of-law rules. Comment 3 to
section 1-105 indicates that the drafters wanted to go further than this. It states that
where a purely state statute would be inapplicable, application of the Code may be
justified by its comprehensiveness, by the policy of uniformity, and by the fact that the
Code reflects the understanding of a business community which transcends state and
even national boundaries. BRAUCHER, INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS, 36-37
(1977).
105. See RUSTER, BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY (FRG), 10-19 (1983).
106. See NORTH, CONTRACT CONFLICTS, in SPANOGLE, supra note 65, at 137-38, 140-41.
107. Convention, supra note 14, arts. 1, 4, 14, 18, 19.
108. Convention, supra note 14, art. 35; U.C.C. SS 2-313, 2-314, 2-315, 2-318 (1989). Paul
Rasor wrote a brilliant essay on warranties. Rasor, The History of Warranties of Quality
in the Sale of Goods: Contract or Tort?-A Case Study in Full Circle, 21 WASH. L. REV.
175 (1982). This might be a fitness for a particular purpose problem. Id. at 206-13.
109. U.C.C. S 2-319 (1989); see SCHMITTHOFF, EXPORT TRADE 27 (7th ed. 1980); LOWE,
COMMERCIAL LAW 466 (6th ed. 1983).
110. U.C.C. S5 2-714(2, 2-715(1) (1989).
111. See U.C.C. S 1-105 comment 3 (1989).
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Where contract negotiation and performance occur in the same
place, the law of "that place" governs formation, validity, inter-
pretation, breach and damages. In this case, negotiations and
performance occurred in the United States.1 2 Given this obser-
vation about the facts, one might conclude that the applicable
contract law is American law.
The EC-Convention on Contract Obligations says that the dis-
putants must apply the law of the place where the defendant
(seller) renders performance."3 Since performance occurs in the
United States, Germany (as a member of the EC), and certainly
its nationals must look to the United States law to address issues
like validity, breach and damages.
The next topic is German law. What is B's position on the
contract? In Germany a contract is a product of offer and accep-
tance."' Further, under German law, acceptances should not be
accompanied by either restrictions or exceptions. In this case,
C's. acceptance was accompanied by an "as is" restriction. Given
this observation about the facts, there would be no acceptance
and no contract under German Law.
The next issue is warranty. C can use the "as is" clause to
restrict his liability.15 In America, B is under a duty to read a
contract to catch clauses like this.l" 6 If B is provided with an
opportunity to read this contract, and he did nothing with the
opportunity given to him, B is bound by the language he did not
read. C can use the "as is" language to block B's recovery of
damages.
By contrast, under German law, C would have to bring the
disclaimer clause to B's attention and procure B's assent. Since
German law is clear on that point, and C didn't do his duty under
German laws, the "as is" clause is invalid. B could recover
damages from C for breach of warranty.
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods (CISG) might pull us out of the conflict of
law quagmire. If America and Germany have signed the Conven-
112. See North, Contract Conflicts in SPANOGLE, supra note 65, at 61.
113. Id. at 60. The author cites Article 4(2) of the EEC Convention.
114. Ruster, supra note 105, at 10-19. Spanogle condenses the narrative to four pages.
SPANOGLE, supra note 65, at 69-72.
115. U.C.C. S 2-316(3Xa) (1989).
116. See FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 263-64 (1990).
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tion, the Convention will resolve all disputes. 117 There may be a
problem, however, under the offer and acceptance provisions.1 8
If C's acceptance alters the terms of the offer-what was solicited
by the offeror (B)-there may be no acceptance and no contract
between the parties. 119
In summary, I would tell B the following. First, B's dispute
with C is governed by the UCC. Second, American conflict of
law principles point to the use of the UCC. Third, German and
American laws tell different stories about contract formation and
liability. Fourth, the EC-Convention on Contract Obligations com-
mends the use of American law. Fifth, the CISG won't help B.
Sixth, B faces a struggle if he pursues warranty damages. Sev-
enth, B could recover consequential damages if B supplied C with
his reasons for buying C's Knickknacks. Eighth, B should check
his insurance to see if this situation is covered by the contract.
Finally, B should apply the law which upholds a contract between
the parties.
V. AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY FRONTIERS
In the previous section we examined a delicate web of ideas,
legislation, international conventions and policies symbolizing con-
tract practice. What's the reality? Is there a frontier (an un-
illuminated landscape) where the previous discussion did not go?
If reality is larger than theory-which is a true statement in
this case-there is turf to be explored. First the landscape looks
like a two dimensional, inverted pyramid (Figure B). Along the
inverted base, the observer will find that manufacturers have
camped at one corner. Purchasers have camped at the other. At
the apex, one will find manufacturers and suppliers of airplane
parts.12
117. Convention, supra note 14, art. 1.
118. If Article 19 adopts the mirror-image-rule and the offer and acceptance clashes,
the Convention may be unavailable to us. See Convention, supra note 14, art. 19.
119. Id.




Manufacturers have simple motivations. They want airplane
orders which guarantee a steady stream of cash and profits. If
the situation presents itself, they will sell planes on credit; lease
them; provide purchasers with credit on spare parts; close a deal
with the option to replace a purchased plane with an innovative
improvement; sell airplanes with the option to buy new or im-
proved models at prices "not fully adjusted for inflation."1 21 They
will guarantee the integrity of the airframe and the performance
characteristics of the engine.' 22 During negotiations some-like
Boeing, for example-will present their opinions about engines
and rival manufacturers' claims on topics like turbines, compres-
sors, fuel consumption and efficiency.as
Purchasers are interested in both government and private
financing, airframe integrity, engine size and reliability, speed,
fuel efficiency and spare parts.' 24 Competition has come down to
"who can provide the best engine for the frame selected by the
purchaser."' 25 To date purchasers make separate contracts with
engine suppliers. They cover matters like the cost of spare parts,
spare engines, and the period of time, typically three thousand
miles, during which the engines must perform reliably. 126 In
recent years, suppliers, to get more customers, have given into
exaggeration. 127 One company has gone into both the brokering
and the banking business,as causing some to wonder, in these
uncertain and troubling days, whether a business alliance be-
First, suppliers (3) and manufacturers (1) make engine purchase agreements (EPA).
They take several years to negotiate and govern the purchase orders submitted by the
manufacturers to the suppliers.
Next, suppliers (3) and purchasers (2) make general term agreements (GTA). They take
several years to negotiate and cover technical data, training and engine guarantees.
Purchase orders (POs) submitted by the purchaser to the supplier are governed by the
GTA. The POs cover quantity of engines, time of delivery, payment terms and price.
Interview with Cynthia Brockman, Contracting Officer Legal Division, General Electric
in Cincinnati, Ohio (Oct. 18, 1990). The terms of these contracts, that is GTAs and EPAs,
constitute proprietary information. J. NEWHOUSE, supra note 15, at 56.
121. J. NEWHOUSE, supra note 15, at 54-55, 60.
122. Id. at 53.
123. Id. at 54.
124. Id. at 61 (recent developments).
125. Id. at 51, 186.
126. See J. NEWHOUSE, supra note 15, at 187.
127. Id. at 54.
128. Weiner, Suppliers in Loan to Northwest, supra note 40, at C1, col. 2; Weiner,
Unusual Deal by America West Seen, supra note 42, at C5, col. 4.
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tween General Electric and Airbus, and General Electric and a
large leasing syndicate like Guiness Peat Aviation selling Airbus
products, will harm Boeing and others, that is, cause them to
lose a great number of airplane orders?
Alliances between engine suppliers and airframe manufactur-
ers, puffery blended with the sale of an engine, and wired
contracts, are not the only thing troubling firms in the airframe
business. Boeing, like other multinational businesses, is worried
about people pirating their technology and the absence of effec-
tive laws or conventions to stop it.12 In recent weeks, the
governments of the United States, France and Germany have
accused one another of violating GATT -subsidizing its airframe
manufacturers to ward off foreign competition. 130
The unauthorized use of patented technology is a worrisome
problem. It can cost the airframe business billions of dollars in
lost revenue." 1 Boeing and its rivals have used contracts, a
federal statute and international agreements to protect their
property. When Boeing (seller), for example, makes a contract
with a purchaser that is controlled by its government, the seller
extracts a promise from the purchaser (the government) that it
will do nothing to impair the value of the patent in that country.
In some cases, the seller extracts a promise that the purchaser
will pay a standard royalty for the reproduction and the use of
patented technology;132 or a promise to pay a smaller sum that
is offset by a tax credit in the seller's country. 1w
On another level, the United States government has the power
to impose sanctions upon, or withdraw trading privileges from,
nations which do nothing to protect American patents abroad.1 4
Under the Paris Convention, a patentee can impose a licensing
agreement and a duty to pay royalties upon an entity that has
129. Boeing should be concerned about this. See J. NEWHOUSE, supra note 15, at 5;
Abbott, Protecting the First World Assets in the Third World: Intellectual Property
Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework, 22 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 691, 697 (1989).
130. Making Airwaves-Turbulence-Tensions Rise as Trade Talks Approach with Sub-
sidized Airbus, Seattle Times, Sep. 20, 1990, at 131; Field, supra note 70, at D5; Labich,
Boeing Battles To Stay on Top, FORTUNE, Sep. 28, 1987, at 71.
131. See Abbott, supra note 129, at 700.
132. Id. at 740.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 707.09.
EUROPEAN DREAM
pirated technology. 18 Under GATT, there is a pending proposal
that "all nations consult, compromise and settle their patent
disputes, when doing nothing would cause trade distortions be-
tween them. ' 1"
It has been said that subsidies of foreign concerns, like Airbus,
make it difficult for Boeing to compete. If most of the world's
air carriers reside in the United States, and Airbus is free,
because of its subsidies, to woo American carriers while Boeing
scrounges for money to build the next plane, Airbus is going to
have the marketing advantage. Europeans say that extensive
Pentagon orders placed with American manufacturers, for planes
that are modified versions of civilian airliners, amount to subsi-
dies.137 It is money going to Boeing, for example, to finance new
planes. It releases time to recapture customers lost to Airbus.
The matter of where airframe companies get money to finance
the next generation of planes came to a head in September, 1990,
and, to everyone's surprise, nothing was done by the concerned
governments.M
VI. EVALUATION
There is a sea change just ahead. No one knows whether
Boeing will face an ill wind. Boeing is worried about the following:
135. Id. at 702-03.
136. Id. at 715-17.
137. Fields, supra note 70, at D5.
138. Id. The United States decided to file a formal complaint with GATT over a
German government program to address losses covered by the high value of the Deutsche
mark against the dollar. The program provides subsidies, asserted the United States, to
Deutche Airbus (the German partner in Airbus). Carla Hills, the U.S. Trade Represen-
tative, said that the German program was "wholly inconsistent" with GATT rules.
Ms. Hills requested the formation of a GATT panel to rule in this case. American
officials said that a GATT ruling, assuming a panel is created, could be handed down
within six months. A ruling favorable to the United States could call on the German
government to end the subsidies, clearing the way for the United States to seek
compensation.
According to American officials, the German Government paid $240 million in subsidies
to Deutsche Airbus and to German component suppliers last year. That sum does not
include the $5.8 billion committed to the Airbus program by the German government
over the past 20 years. According to a study commissioned by the Commerce Department,
total government support provided to all Airbus partner companies amounted to $13.5
billion, or $19.4 billion, if interest costs are included. U.S. Files Formal Complaint with
GATT over German Subsidies for Airbus Industries, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at
262 (Feb. 20, 1991); see Dullforce, GATT Told of Dollars 257m German Airbus Subsidies,
Fin. Times, Feb. 27, 1991, S 1, at 7; International Trade, U.S. EC at Odds Over Which
GATT Committee has Jurisdiction in the Airbus Industrie Dispute, Daily Rep. for Exec-
utives (BNA) (Mar. 7, 1991).
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(1) people pirating its technology; (2) the indeterminate nature of
its marketing strategy in Eastern Europe; (3) government funding
(subsidies) of Airbus; (4) the economic fallout that will befall
Boeing if the American government takes no action on the sub-
sidy issue under GATT; (5) the loss of sales to Airbus; (6) the
loss of market share to Airbus; (7) alliances between American
engine suppliers, world-wide leasing companies, and Airbus; (8)
the use of American engine suppliers like General Electric to
broker Airbus products; (9) the use of American engine manufac-
turers to finance the sale of Airbus products in the United States;
and (10) the volatility of the demand for energy.
If Europe is distracted by the crisis in the Middle East, or the
"common currency" issue is not resolved under the Rome Treaty
(the basic agreement establishing the EEC),ls there will be less
time and attention and, perhaps, less money to spend on Airbus
Industries. If you put the matter in a different context, from
Boeing's perspective, Airbus looks like a four legged stool. One
leg, Germany, is preoccupied with its reunification.140 It has to
spend billions of marks-money it might have spent on Airbus-
on the reconstruction of East Germany.141 France's economy,
heavily dependent upon foreign oil, is subject to oil shocks.142
England is in political and economic turmoil.1 43 If anyone of these
nations (legs) is unable to carry its consortium load in the near
future, Airbus will become Boeing's weak foe. Boeing will exploit
its markets in Eastern Europe; it will corner Western European
suppliers and customers it lost to Airbus. It will appeal to
customers around the globe whom Airbus can no longer reach.
In this setting, because Boeing planes will be in demand, the
patent issue will get addressed in GATT. Boeing and the United
States government will have some leverage in the next round of
139. Riding, Hesitation Now Greets Europe's Unity Plan, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1990, at
C1, col. 3; see Prokesch, Kohl Plan Breathes Life into Monetary Union, N.Y. Times, Oct.
22, 1990, at C8, col. 5; Neher, Paris Futures Market Starts New Contract: Greater Allure
Sought by Linking European Currency Unit to Issue, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1990, at C8, col.
1; see also Kennedy, supra note 7, at 473, 475; Lewis, The Bane of Nations, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 28, 1990, at A15, col. 1.
140. Protzman, Slowing Economy Predicted for a United Germany, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23,
1990, at C20, col. 3; see P. KENNEDY, supra note 8, at 483-84.
141. Protzman, supra note 140, at C20.
142. P. KENNEDY, supra note 8, at 483-84.
143. Id. at 480-82. Spain is the fourth leg of the stool. See International Trade, U.S.
EC at Odds, supra note 138.
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negotiations. The subsidy issue will get buried in a pile of
diplomatic papers-there will be no need to squawk about it.
Boeing's markets will show some expansion. There will be some
increases in the firm's sales volume. Engine suppliers will have
to rethink their positions with regards to alliances with non-
engine suppliers.1" Boeing will have time to fashion its airplane
partnership the way it wishes with Japan. 1
This rosy picture rests upon the assumption that Europeans
aren't smart enough to sense the ill winds blowing their way. 10
What is their solution to this currency crisis?1 47 How would they
finesse the Middle East crisis? First, Europe should purchase oil
from Saudi Arabia to recoup the oil. it lost in Kuwait. Second,
France or Germany should open negotiations with the Soviet
Union, hoping that nation will sell oil to the West for hard
currency. Next, as regards the currency crisis, Europe could
embrace the British Chancellor of the Exchequer's plan.'" As an
interim step, a so-called expression of interest, nine nations could
create a convertible hard currency. Acting as the 13th currency -
value being linked with the currencies belonging to the European
Monetary System-the new money could replace The European
Currency Unit.149 Taking these steps would both brighten Eu-
rope's future, promote stability, and halt the machinery that
would propel Boeing ahead of Airbus. '
VII. CONCLUSION
In closing, Boeing's future (perhaps the future of other fretting
businesses) is neither grim nor generously bright. Snags slowing
European unification may weaken Airbus. Political wrangles may
provide Boeing with time to fortify itself against the next round
of competition and, hopefully, reduce the pressure to accept hasty
solutions to nagging subsidy and patent problems. In the final
analysis time will tell all.
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